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NOTE
DECIPHERING DAUBERT’S DILEMMA:
USING PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS TO ASSIGN
LIABILITY WHERE A DEFENDANT HAS NOT MORE
THAN DOUBLED THE LIKELIHOOD OF A
PLAINTIFF’S HARM
Christopher Collins†
I. INTRODUCTION
After thirty-eight weeks of anxiety and preparation, the time has finally
arrived. “Ten fingers and ten toes is all I ask, Lord.” The doctor emerges
from the delivery room. “It’s a boy!” he exclaims. Weeks go by and all
appears well. Your son eventually becomes accustomed to sleeping through
the night. You become accustomed to the new demands on your time that a
new child represents. However, after a few months, it becomes apparent
that something is wrong. While most children his age are babbling,
attempting to mimic their parents’ facial expressions, and performing other
age-appropriate actions, your son appears reclusive and unresponsive. A
trip to the doctor reveals your son suffers from autism. The cause is
unknown and treatment options are limited.
For millions of American families, this scenario has become all too real.
The incidence of conditions such as autism and attention deficit disorder
(“ADD”) have increased exponentially over the past twenty years.1 While
† Student Development Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 10. J.D.
Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2016). I would like to thank my Lord and
Savior Jesus Christ for saving me out of darkness when I was yet His enemy. I would like to
thank my father for teaching me to love justice and my mother for teaching me compassion
by her unconditional love. I would also like to thank my professors here at LU Law for
investing their lives in helping me and my fellow classmates achieve our God-given potential.
Finally, I would like to thank my law school friends (especially my study group) for inspiring
me to be the very best that I can be. You helped make this the toughest job I’ve ever loved!
1. See Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: Data & Statistics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/adhd/data.html (last updated July 8,
2015) (“Rates of ADHD diagnosis increased an average of 3% per year from 1997 to 2006 . . .
and an average of approximately 5% per year from 2003 to 2011.”); Autism Spectrum
Disorder (ASD): Data & Statistics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/data.html (last updated Aug. 12, 2015) (noting that the
incidence of autism among eight year olds increased from 1 in 150 in 2000 to 1 in 68 in
2010); Latest Autism Statistics, TALK ABOUT CURING AUTISM (Apr. 17, 2012),
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speculation abounds regarding the reasons for the increase, ranging from
immunization shots to artificial sweeteners, no definitive cause has yet been
established. Suppose, however, that sufficient evidence were to emerge
linking a particular product to a significant increase in a condition such as
autism, ADD, or an even more debilitating disorder. Suppose further that
research showed that children who were exposed to that product had a
greater chance of developing the condition than those who were not
exposed. Imagine how you would feel if you were told by your state
supreme court that the product’s manufacturer would not have to pay
anything for producing the product that harmed your child. That is exactly
what the plaintiffs in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., were
told, despite the fact that multiple studies linked an increase in birth defects
to use of Bendectin—a drug their mothers had taken to combat morning
sickness. 2
This Note focuses on the unjust results of allowing restrictive notions of
causation to insulate negligent businesses from liability in cases such as
Daubert.3 Once a statistically significant connection has been established
linking a product to a particular harm, all efforts should be made to ensure
that those harmed by the product are made whole, to the extent that it is
possible to do so. Using statistics4 and principles of equity, this Note seeks
to explain how a system could be implemented which would provide a
remedy to plaintiffs, while holding manufacturers accountable for the exact
amount of harm which their negligence produced—no more and no less.
Finally, this Note will look at the practical consequences of awarding less
than the amount necessary to fully compensate victims for the harm that
they have suffered.

http://www.tacanow.org/family-resources/latest-autism-statistics-2 (estimating that only 1 in
1000 children were diagnosed with autism in 1995).
2. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
3. Currently, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits maintain the more than doubling
requirement, in addition to several states, including California and Vermont. See Andrew
Jurs, Judicial Analysis of Complex & Cutting-Edge Science in the Daubert Era: Epidemiologic
Risk Assessment as a Test Case for Reform Strategies, 42 CONN. L. REV. 49, 60 (2009). See also
Blanchard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 30 A.3d 1271, 1277-78 (Vt. 2011); In re Lockheed
Litig. Cases, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34, 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
4. The author taught high school mathematics for nineteen years before attending law
school.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Purpose of Tort Liability
For as long as mankind has interacted in a social setting, people have
acted in ways that hurt others, either intentionally5 or accidentally.6 To keep
individuals from “tak[ing] the law into their own hands,” governments have
instituted methods to make the victims of these acts whole, or to
compensate them for their loss in cases in which the person or property
damaged or destroyed cannot be restored.7 Additional reasons for providing
remedies for injured parties include: “deter[ing] wrongful
conduct; . . . encourag[ing] socially responsible behavior; . . . [and]
restor[ing] injured parties to their original condition.”8 These principles are
so inherent in our collective consciousness that we can rightly conclude that
they originate not from the government, which protects our right to enforce
them, but from a source that pre-exists the institution of government. In the
foundational case of Marbury v. Madison, the Court held that “[i]t is a
settled and invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have
a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”9
But what happens when government does not provide a remedy when
one party has obviously wronged another? Are not the purposes for which
tort liability was instituted inevitably defeated? Not only is wrongful
conduct not deterred, but socially irresponsible behavior is encouraged and
injured parties are left to defend themselves in their own strength, or not at
all. As these cannot be the proper goals of a government that defends the
weak against the strong,10 our society should extend every possible

5. Genesis 4:8 (King James) (“And Cain talked with Abel his brother: and it came to
pass, when they were in the field, that Cain rose up against Abel his brother, and slew him.”).
6. Exodus 21:33-34 (KJV) (“And if a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit,
and not cover it, and an ox or an ass fall therein; the owner of the pit shall make it good, and
give money unto the owner of them; and the dead beast shall be his.”).
7. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY, & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND
SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (12th ed. 2010).
8. Id.
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803).
10. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 179 (5th ed. 1728) (“[W]here there is
no law there is no freedom. For Liberty is to be free from Restraint and Violence from others;
which cannot be, where there is no law: But Freedom is not, as we are told, A Liberty for
every Man to do what he lists, (for who could be free, when every other Man’s Humour might
domineer over him?) . . . .”) (italics in original).
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opportunity to provide relief and demand accountability where it is
reasonably practical to do so.11
B. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
In studying Torts, many law students are left with a profound sense that
justice was not achieved in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. In Daubert,
the plaintiffs, who were minors, sought to recover for birth defects that
might have been caused by Merrell Dow’s drug, Bendectin.12 Even though
the plaintiffs were not able to demonstrate that their particular injuries were
caused as a result of their mothers having taken Bendectin while the
plaintiffs were in utero, they presented evidence that suggested that
Bendectin increased the occurrence of birth defects similar to the ones that
they experienced.13 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were precluded
from recovery for two reasons. First, the evidence they presented did not
meet the scientific standards necessary to prove causation.14 Second, under
California law, which the court applied, the plaintiffs were required to prove
not only that Bendectin increased the occurrence of birth defects, but that it
“more than doubled” their occurrence.15
While the U.S. Supreme Court and nearly all legal publications have
focused on the first issue,16 there has been little analysis devoted to curing
the obvious injustice that allowed a negligent company, whose product is
known to increase the occurrence of injuries, to escape liability. The Ninth
Circuit acknowledged as much when it noted, “No doubt, there will be
unjust results under this substantive standard. . . . [S]ome plaintiffs whose
11. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (“The purpose
of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are
borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves.”).
12. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). Ironically,
the increased incident of birth defects resulting from using Bendectin appears to be so small
that the plaintiffs in Daubert would be precluded from recovery even under the system that
this Note proposes. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1354-56 (6th Cir.
1992).
13. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1320 (“[S]tatistical studies show that Bendectin use increases the
risk of birth defects.”).
14. Id. at 1314.
15. Id. at 1320.
16. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993);
Suedabeh Walker, Drawing on Daubert: Bringing Reliability to the Forefront in the
Admissibility of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 62 EMORY L.J. 1205 (2013); David Paul
Horowitz, “Will the Gatekeeper Let Daubert in?”, N.Y. ST. B.J., June 2006, at 18; Henry G.
Miller, The Daubert Debacle, N.Y. St. B.J., March/April 2005, at 24.
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injuries are attributable to the drug will be unable to recover.”17 The court
was unwilling to dispense with the “more than doubling” requirement,
however, stating that “[t]here is a converse unfairness under a regime that
allows recovery to everyone that may have been affected by the drug.”18
In other words, it would be just as unfair to force manufacturers to pay
for injuries that their products did not cause (at least with respect to a
particular plaintiff) as it would be to prevent injured parties from
recovering, knowing that some un-quantified portion of them were, indeed,
harmed by the company’s drug. Under traditional tort law, it is necessary to
prove that a plaintiff’s injuries were “more likely than not” caused by a
particular defendant.19 This requirement ensures that a defendant will not
be held liable for an injury unless the evidence demonstrates that they were
most likely the cause of a plaintiff’s injuries. This is a difficult enough task
when only a single source of injury is alleged. When, as in Daubert, similar
birth defects occur naturally, proving that one’s injuries were caused by a
particular defendant and not via natural causes is impossible.20
In attempting to find a middle ground, California law allows plaintiffs to
collect when they are able to show that a drug causes injuries similar to their
own, but insists that plaintiffs prove that the drug “more than doubles” the
incidence of those injuries among those who are exposed to it.21 On the
surface, this seems reasonable. It satisfies the “more likely than not”
requirement of traditional tort law and protects manufacturers from paying
for injuries for which they are not responsible. Upon closer inspection,
however, three major injustices result.
First, manufacturers whose products are known to increase the incidence
of injuries to unsuspecting consumers are not held responsible for their
actions. Second, innocent consumers, some of whom were harmed by the
manufacturer’s negligence, are prevented from recovering for those injuries.
Third, manufacturers whose products more than double the risk of
suffering an injury are forced to pay for all plaintiffs’ injuries, despite the
fact that a significant portion of those injuries are naturally occurring and
are not in any way attributable to the manufacturers’ negligence.22
17. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1320 n.13.
18. Id. at 1320 (emphasis included in original).
19. Id.
20. Id. (“In the case of birth defects, carrying this burden is made more difficult because
we know that some defects . . . occur even when expectant mothers do not take Bendectin.”).
21. Id. at 1320-21.
22. To illustrate this point, suppose a certain birth defect occurs naturally in 3 out of
1000 live births among those who are not exposed to a particular drug. Suppose further that
among those who take a particular drug, 5 out of 1000 are born with that defect. Under the
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Unable to solve this problem in a way that provided justice for all, the
Ninth Circuit denied any recovery by these or similarly situated plaintiffs.23
However, the solution to overcoming the more likely than not standard lay
in the California Supreme Court’s own precedent. Utilizing the principles of
equity, the court had already solved this problem twice before in Summers
v. Tice24 and Sindell v. Abbot Labs. 25 Whereas the law is consistent and
inflexible, “equity jurisprudence evolved as a means of avoiding injustices
when meritorious claims failed to fit the rigid causes of action known at
law.”26 The purpose of tort law is to make victims whole.27 The purpose of
equity is to provide justice to those whose injuries the law cannot remedy.28
Recognizing the power of equity to overcome inflexible notions of
causation, the court had twice before provided a remedy for plaintiffs when
it found a strong connection between their injuries and the defendants’
negligence.
C. Summers v. Tice
In Summers, the court was faced with the problem of how to provide
justice for a man who was injured when it could not determine which of
two defendants had caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The plaintiff and the two
defendants were using shotguns to hunt for quail on November 20, 1945.29
Before the parties began to hunt, the plaintiff instructed the defendants how
to shoot safely and of the importance of remaining “in line.”30 After
ensuring that the defendants had a clear view of his position, one of the
defendants “flushed a quail . . . [which] flew between plaintiff and the

holding in Daubert, none of those who exhibit this defect will be able to collect from the
drug’s manufacturer, even though 2/5 of those affected were, in fact, harmed by the
manufacturer’s drug. Under the same holding, if 7 out of 1000 are born with the defect, all
plaintiffs may hold the manufacturer liable, even though 3/7 would have been born with the
defect without any negligence on the part of the manufacturer. In the first scenario, the
manufacturer escapes liability entirely, whereas in the second it is held liable for even those
injuries that it did not produce.
23. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1320-21.
24. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
25. Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
26. Estate of Murray v. Spiegle, 58 A.3d 1228, 1232 n.4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
27. SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 535.
28. CHRISTINA L. KUNZ & CAROL L. CHOMSKY, CONTRACTS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH
162-63 (2d ed. 2013).
29. Summers, 199 P.2d at 2.
30. Id.
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defendants.”31 In attempting to shoot the quail, both defendants fired in the
direction of the plaintiff from seventy-five yards away, striking the plaintiff
in the eye and lip.32
The court had no trouble concluding that the defendants had been
negligent. The problem was in determining how to hold either of them
accountable, since each was equally likely to have caused the plaintiff’s
injuries.33 Under California law, the plaintiff was required to prove that a
particular defendant was “more likely than not” the party responsible for
having caused the plaintiff’s injuries.34 Since there was insufficient evidence
to prove which defendant had harmed the plaintiff, there was a fifty percent
chance that each individual had produced the harm.35 Because fifty percent
is exactly half, and not more than half, it was not “more likely than not” that
either defendant had produced the harm.
Unable to determine which of the defendants had produced the
plaintiff’s injuries, the court placed the burden of proving causation on the
defendants.36 Abandoning the “more than doubling” requirement, the court
reasoned that since both defendants had been negligent, and they were in a
better position to determine which of them was liable than was the injured
plaintiff, it would be unjust to prevent the plaintiff from recovering.37 The
court reasoned that “[t]o hold otherwise would be to exonerate both from
liability, although each was negligent, and the injury resulted from such
negligence.”38
D. Sindell v. Abbott Labs
Over thirty years later in Sindell, the court found a creative way to
provide justice for a class of victims whose mothers had taken
diethylstilbesterol (“DES”). The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
approved DES for experimental use in 1947.39 The FDA ordered DES
manufacturers to stop producing the drug in 1971 after it found an

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. LaPorte v. Houston, 199 P.2d 665, 666 (Cal. 1948).
35. Summers, 199 P.2d at 5 (“[W]here the matter of apportionment is incapable of
proof, the innocent wronged party should not be deprived of his right to redress.”).
36. Id. at 5.
37. Id. at 6.
38. Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Oliver v. Miles, 110 So. 666, 668 (Miss. 1926)).
39. Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal. 1980).
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increased incidence of cancer in the children of Bendectin users.40 The
plaintiffs in Sindell alleged that the defendant manufacturers had marketed
the product without warning of its potentially harmful effects and without
communicating that it was an experimental drug.41
Although the plaintiffs demonstrated that DES was responsible for their
injuries, they were unable to determine which manufacturer had produced
the particular pills that their mothers had ingested.42 The court allowed the
plaintiffs to continue by treating all manufacturers of DES as a single source
of injury and attributing liability to each individual manufacturer based on
that company’s share of the overall DES market.43 The court went on to
provide that a defendant could escape liability entirely if it could show that
it could not possibly have produced the drug that caused that particular
defendant’s injuries.44 In fact, “one of the original defendants was dismissed
from the action upon proof that it did not manufacture DES until after
plaintiff was born.”45
The court reasoned that its response could be “either to adhere rigidly to
prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such products, or to
fashion remedies to meet [the] changing needs” of an industrial society.46
The court went on to cite Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion in Escola,
stating that “the traditional standard of negligence was insufficient to
govern the obligations of manufacturer to consumer,”47 reasoning that
“between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should
bear the cost of the injury.”48
The Sindell court accomplished what the Ninth Circuit was unable to do
fifteen years later in Daubert. The court provided a remedy to all plaintiffs
who suffered the type of injuries that the defendants’ negligence had
produced, while requiring the defendants to pay for only that portion of the
defendants’ injuries that its own negligence produced.49 In contrast, the
Ninth Circuit in Daubert was unwilling to apply this reasoning, since it
40. Id. at 925-26.
41. Id. at 926.
42. DES was produced by over a hundred manufacturers and “was produced from a
common and mutually agreed upon formula as a fungible drug interchangeable with other
brands of the same product.” Id.
43. Id. at 937.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 930.
46. Id. at 936.
47. Id. (citing Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (1944)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 937.
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could not be proven that all plaintiffs were injured by the defendants’
negligence. This was not required in Sindell. In fact, the court required that
only those manufacturers who were collectively responsible for producing
“a substantial share” of the total DES market be joined.50 The court rejected
the figures of seventy-five to eighty percent,51 suggesting that liability could
be assigned even where another party or parties had produced more than
twenty-five percent of the harm for which the named defendants would be
held accountable.52 Nonetheless, the court was satisfied that “[e]ach
defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented
by its share of that market . . . Under this approach, each manufacturer’s
liability would approximate its responsibility for the injuries caused by its
own products.”53 The Sindell court explained why this is the most equitable
solution:
[I]f X Manufacturer sold one-fifth of all the DES prescribed for
pregnancy and identification could be made in all cases, X would
be the sole defendant in approximately one-fifth of all cases and
liable for all the damages in those cases. Under alternative
liability, X would be joined in all cases in which identification
could not be made, but liable for only one-fifth of the total
damages in these cases. X would pay the same amount either
way. Although the correlation is not, in practice, perfect . . . , it is
close enough so that defendants’ objections on the ground of
fairness lose their value.54
The court dispensed with the traditional requirement of proving that a
particular defendant was more likely than not the cause of each plaintiff’s
individual injuries. By pooling the plaintiffs and defendants into groups and
assigning liability for the plaintiffs’ injuries collectively, the court fashioned
a remedy that ensured that each defendant was held accountable for the
amount of damage that its products caused to the group as a whole.

50. Id.
51. This figure was suggested by a law review comment: Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES
and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 996 (1978).
52. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id. n.28 (quoting Sheiner, Comment, supra note 51).
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III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Determining Sufficient Statistical Correlation
Before adopting a new system for determining causation, the first thing
to decide is how great an increase in the occurrence of harm should be
required before relative liability55 can be assigned. This determination
depends on a number of factors used to calculate the likelihood that the
imputed cause is actually responsible for at least part of the harm that the
plaintiffs suffered. These factors include: the number of studies conducted;
the sample size of each study; whether the sampled population fairly
represents the overall, affected population; and the level of impartiality of
the party conducting the study. This Note will consider only empirically
objective factors, such as sample size and number of studies. The fact finder
will have to weigh subjective factors, such as diversity and impartiality, to
determine whether an individual study is sufficiently representative and
impartial to permit it to be considered in the analysis. Included below is a
brief discussion of standard deviations which demonstrates that certain
results deserve heightened scrutiny.
1

Historically Sufficient Levels of Causation

In determining a level that fairly represents the amount of increased
incidence of defects necessary to assign liability, examining other cases that
have already addressed the question of certainty can be helpful. In Sindell,
the court only required that a substantial percentage of market share
manufacturers be joined.56 Therefore, with respect to any given plaintiff,
there was a ten percent chance that none of the parties held accountable
were actually responsible for that party’s injuries. This would also be true
with respect to the class of plaintiffs as a whole. To be sufficiently reliable,
therefore, a method need not produce a 100% correlation between plaintiffs
allowed to recover and parties actually harmed by the defendants.57 In
Summers, the court required both defendants to pay for the plaintiff’s
injuries, even though only one of them produced the harm. The court
55. “Relative liability” is the term the author is using to refer to this theory.
56. Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980).
57. For example, if 400 people are victims and the defendants, as a class, represent 90%
of the market share for producing the drug that caused their harm, then most likely 360 (90%
x 400) of them were harmed by the defendants. That means that it is likely that 40 of them
were not harmed by the defendants. Using the approach in Sindell, these 40 plaintiffs would
also be allowed to collect for their injuries despite the fact that the defendants may not have
been responsible for their injuries. Under Sindell, 10% is apparently an acceptable margin of
error.
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assigned liability even though it knew that one of the defendants would be
required to pay for half of a plaintiff’s damages which he had not caused.
In each of these cases, the court was concerned with “the practical
unfairness of denying the injured person redress simply because he cannot
prove how much damage each [defendant] did” and concluded: “[L]et them
be the ones to apportion it among themselves.”58 The court held this to be
especially equitable in instances in which it is impossible to determine
which negligent act produced the harm, stating “[s]ince, then, the difficulty
of proof is the reason, the rule should apply whenever the harm has plural
causes, and not merely when they acted in conscious concert.”59 This same
rule should apply in cases in which natural or unknown sources are among
the “plural causes.”
2. Calculating Sufficient Mathematical Causality60
A few formulae are particularly useful in determining the accuracy of
statistical samples. Among these are the Small Population Formula, the Chi
Square Test, and the calculation of standard deviations among samples.
Using these techniques, it is possible to analyze data to determine how
reliable it is and what insight, if any, the data provides when determining
how many of the potential victims were harmed by the manufacturer’s
product.
a. Small Population Formula: Calculating Margin of Error
The small population formula is used to calculate the margin of error in a
sample that is significantly smaller than the total population it seeks to
represent.61 This same formula is used to compute the margin of error in
political polls. A smaller margin of error means greater accuracy.62 Using
this formula, the margin of error can be calculated as “.98√[(N-n)/(Nn-n)],”

58. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Cal. 1948).
59. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
60. For this Note, the author has chosen to place the mathematical calculations in the
footnotes, thus allowing for greater readability while allowing anyone who wishes to verify
the accuracy of the calculations the ability to do so easily.
61. How to Compute the Margin of Error (3 Easy Methods), EHOW,
http://www.ehow.com/how_5276026_compute-margin-error-easy-methods.html
(last
visited Oct. 17, 2015).
62. Id.

246

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:235

with “N” representing the total population represented and “n”
representing the size of the sample group. 63
Suppose that in a town of 10,000 people, forty should, on average,
contract a particular disease. Suppose further that in a sample of 1000
people, seven contract the disease. Leaving the issue of the significance of
the result (7) for the next section, how reliable is a sample size of 1000 in
representing the overall population of 10,000? Applying the formula yields a
margin of error of 2.94%.64 This means that whatever level of significance
the result of “7” represents, it will only need to be adjusted, at most, by
2.94%, up or down.
The next step in the analysis is to determine how unusual a result of “7”
would be, given that the expected number of persons per thousand
evidencing the disease is 4 (i.e., 40 per 10,000 = 4 per 1000). To calculate
this, it is first necessary to define the variables that will be used in the
formula. The first variable, “n,” represents the number of people being
sampled: in this case, 1000. The second variable, “r,” represents the number
of people exhibiting the particular trait: in this case, 7. The third variable,
“m,” represents the expected number of people exhibiting the trait in
question: in this case, four.
A third expression, “nCr,” represents the number of ways that r (7)
selections can be arranged out of a total of n (1000) sampled. For example,
the only two possible outcomes of a coin flip are “heads” and “tails”—each
equally likely to occur. If a coin is flipped five times, how many ways could
the result include exactly two heads? Mathematically, this could be
expressed as “5C2,” and the result is 10.65 Using these three expressions, n, c,
and nCr, the probability of a specific number of outcomes occurring when
the expected number is known can be expressed using the formula: Pr= ((1(m/n))n-r(m/n)r(nCr).
Applying this formula yields the expression: P7= ((1-(4/1000))10007
(4/1000)7(1000C7). This is approximately equal to six percent.66 This

63. Id. (“For example, suppose a small college has 2,500 students and 800 of them
answer a survey. With the formula above, we calculate the margin of error to be
0.98sqrt[1700/2000000-800] = .0286”).
64. MOE = .98√[(N-n)/(Nn-n)]. Since “N”=10,000 and “n”=1000, MOE=0.98
√[(10,000-1000)/((10,000)(1000)-1000)]. Simplifying yields MOE = 0.98√(9,000/9,999,000)
≈.0294 or 2.94%.
65. 5C2= (5!)/((5-2)!(2!)) = ((5432)/(32)(2)) = 120/12=10. The ten possible
arrangements are: TTTHH, TTHTH, TTHHT, THTTH, THTHT, THHTT, HTTTH,
HTTTH, HTTHT, HTHTT, and HHTTT. See ASHLEY SAUNDERS LIPSON, MATHEMATICS,
PHYSICS AND FINANCE FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION 163 (2011).
66. (1-.004)993(.004)7(1000C7) = (.996993)(.0047)(194,280,608,456,793,000) ≈.0595.
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means that in a sampling of 1000 people, with each person possessing a
4/1000 chance of exhibiting the trait, there is only a six percent chance that
seven of those people would possess the trait. This is only the probability
that exactly seven people will possess the trait; it does not account for the
chances that more than seven people will possess the trait. To calculate the
probability that at least seven people will possess the trait, it is necessary to
calculate each of those possibilities separately and then add them all
together. Each step farther away from the expected value (8, 9, 10 …) yields
a much smaller probability of that result occurring. In this case, the total
probability of at least seven people showing signs of this disease out of a
sample size of 1000 is approximately eleven percent.67
This means that in a study of 1000 people , there is only an 8-14%
likelihood (11%±2.94) that at least seven people would exhibit signs of this
condition. Therefore, it is approximately 86-92% likely that this result
signifies that this sample represents a deviation from the norm, suggesting
that there are more people in the overall population carrying this condition
than were expected. Since the only known difference between this sample of
people and those among the general population is exposure to the drug in
question, it is very likely that the drug is responsible for this increase.
While this does not provide absolute certainty that a drug has increased
the incidence of an occurrence, this conclusion is far more likely than not to
be correct. While it is not more likely than not that the manufacturer’s
product harmed any individual plaintiff, it has more likely than not
contributed to the increase in occurrence of the specified disease or illness.
It should be noted that the law has never demanded certainty before
assigning liability. “More likely than not” allows for recovery in cases in
which there is as much as a 49% chance that the defendant did not cause a
plaintiff’s injuries.
b. Chi Square Test
A second way of determining causality is by using the Chi Square Test
(also referred to as the “Pearson test”). Statisticians often use this test to
compare actual and expected values to determine if there is a significant
statistical aberration between the two.68 Among other things, the Chi Square
Test can be used to evaluate: the existence of bias in jury selection; divergent
treatment involving race or gender; the effects of drugs on humans and
animals; and the significance of disparities in achievement.69 Using the
67. P8≈.0297,
P9≈.0131,
P10≈.0052,
P1000≈.0019.
∑1000
((.996)^(1000-n))((.004)^n)(1000Cn) ≈ .11, or 11%.
7
68. Bazile v. City of Houston, 858 F. Supp. 2d 718, 738-39 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
69. N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Mansfield, 866 F.2d 162, 167-68 (6th Cir. 1989).
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hypothetical example that was referenced in the previous section—with 40
out of 10,000 in the general population contracting the disease while 7 out
of 1000 who are exposed contract it—the following table can be
constructed.70

General Population
Exposed Population

With Disease
“a”
40
“c”
7

Without Disease
“b”
9960
“d”
993

Using this information, the formula for the Chi Square test is: ((adbc)2(a+b+c+d)) / ((a+b)(c+d)(b+d)(a+c)).71 This yields a Chi Square of
approximately 1.923.72 By referencing a Chi Square distribution table, this
means that a result as divergent as this should be expected to occur in
between 10-20% of random samples.73 This correlates very strongly to the
result that was obtained in the earlier calculation of (11±2.94)%. Under Chi
Square methodology, an arbitrary value of 5% is used to express the
maximum value (called the alpha level) that represents a sufficient statistical
aberration to signify a conclusive link between cause and effect.74 Hence, in
this hypothetical, the value of 8-14% would fail the test.
On the surface, it may appear that the result obtained depends upon
which method is used. While this may be true in terms of the ultimate
conclusion (pass/fail), the value obtained using either method is the same in
terms of the likelihood that the drug is responsible for causing the disease.
Both methods produced values between 10-20%. The only difference
between the two methods is the significance attached to the outcomes. The
Chi Square method requires a value that is no larger than 5%. The Small
Population Formula has no such arbitrary minimum value. While the Chi
Square Method is easier to calculate, the Small Population Formula yields a
70. The table is the author’s own creation and has been constructed to provide an easy
means of identifying the variables used in the Chi Square formula.
71. Chi Square Statistics, MATHBEANS PROJECT, http://math.hws.edu/javamath/ryan/
ChiSquare.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
72. (((40*993)-(9,960*7))2(40+9,960+7+993))/((40+9,960)(7+993)(9,960+993)(40+7))
=
((39,720-69,720)2(11,000))/((10,000)(1000)(10,953)(47)) = ((-30,000)2(11,000))/(5,147,910,000,000)
= (9,900,000,000,000)/(5,147,910,000,000) ≈ 1.923.
73. Values of the Chi-squared Distribution Table, MEDCALC, http://www.medcalc.org/
manual/chi-square-table.php (last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
74. Bazile v. City of Houston, 858 F. Supp. 2d 718, 738-39 (S.D. Tex. 2012). See Chi
Square Statistics, supra note 71.
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more precise value (as opposed to a range of values). To illustrate the
difference required to meet the Chi Square 5%, consider the following
scenarios.
Instead of 7 out of 1000 people showing signs of the disease, suppose that
9 were affected. That would produce a Chi Square of 5.125,75 which
correlates to a likelihood of just under 5%,76 a value that would meet the
test. Another way to reach a sufficient level would be to increase the sample
size. If, for example, 2000 people had been sampled and the same ratio of
people showed symptoms, then there would be 14 people affected.77 This
would yield a Chi Square of 5.381,78 representing a likelihood of just over
2%.79 This drastic effect on probabilities shows how much the outcome is
affected by sample size.
c. Standard Deviation: Calculating Consistency Between Samples
Of course, additional testing would also increase certainty. Not only
would additional testing provide more samples, it would also provide a
means by which the samples could be compared with one another to
determine the consistency of results. The concept of consistency between
repeated samples is referred to as “standard deviation.”80
Samples whose results are highly consistent provide evidence that the
results are trustworthy; conversely, samples with widely divergent outcomes
cast doubt on the reliability of the results. 81 Sometimes, the results of a
single sample may be so far outside the mainstream of collected data as to
increase suspicion of its validity. Such a result is called an “outlier.”82
Existence of an outlier could indicate that the sample was not chosen
entirely at random, or that some form of bias or even human error entered

75. (((40*991)-(9,960*9))2(40+9,960+9+991))/((40+9,960)(9+991)(9,960+991)(40+9)) =
((39,640-89,640)2(11,000))/((10,000)(1000)(10,951)(49))
=
((-50,000)2(11,000))/
(5,365,990,000,000) = (27,500,000,000,000) / (5,365,990,000,000) ≈ 5.125.
76. See Values, supra note 73.
77. 7/1000 = .007; 14/2000 = .007.
78. (((40*1,986)-(9,960*14))2(40+9,960+14+1,986))/((40+9,960)(14+1,986)(9,960+1,986)
(40+14)) = ((79,440-139,440)2(11,000))/((10,000)(1000)(11,946)(56)) = ((-60,000)2(11,000))/
(7,358,736,000,000) = (39,600,000,000,000)/(7,358,736,000,000) ≈ 5.381.
79. See Values, supra note 73.
80. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Am. Nat. Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1191 (4th Cir.
1981) (“As standard deviations increase numerically, the probability of chance as the cause
of revealed underrepresentation of course diminishes.”).
81. LIPSON, supra note 65 at 220.
82. Kennerson v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-6591 MAT, 2012 WL 3204055, at *9 (W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 3, 2012).
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into the gathering and recording of the data.83 The existence of an outlier
could also merely indicate that the population sampled contained an
unusually heavy or light concentration of people exhibiting the specific trait
being tested.
Assume that in addition to the sample utilized above, nine more samples
consisting of 1000 people each are taken. If the results of those samples were
especially consistent it would lend confidence to the results. Suppose that
the results were as follows: 67, 68, 73, 72, 50, 79, 100, 70, and 51. The
average of the results would be “7” per thousand, the same as in the
calculations of the previous sample.84 By comparing the data from the ten
groups, the consistency of the results can be calculated as the standard
deviation.
Using the results in the previous paragraph, the standard deviation is
approximately 13.3.85 Since 68.26% of data is expected to fall within one
standard deviation of the mean86, or average (70), we should expect that the
samples would return seven results87 between 56.788 and 83.3.89 In fact, there
are exactly seven results in that range, with only “50,” “51,” and “100” lying
outside it. To see how unusual these results are, we look to see if they are
within two standard deviations of the mean. 95.44% of data typically fall
within two standard deviations.90 Here, that range is 43.4 to 96.6.91 It is
expected that there would be either one or zero results lying outside that
range.92 In this case, only “100” lies outside two standard deviations.
As is illustrated above, by calculating the standard deviation of a series of
data samples, it is possible to express how consistent samples are and
outliers can be identified. Deciding whether to include or discard outliers is
an important decision since this decision affects both the mean and the
standard deviation. For example, if the value of “100” is deemed to be too
83. LIPSON, supra note 65 at 219.
84. (70+67+68+73+72+50+79+100+70+51)/9 = 700/10 = 70.
85. √(Σ(X-M)2/n)
=
√((02+32+22+32+22+202+92+302+02+192)/10)
=
√((0+9+4+9+4+400+81+900+0+361)/10) = √(1768/10) = √176.8 ≈13.3.
86. Lesson 2: The Standard Deviation, NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIV.,
http://www.fgse.nova.edu/edl/secure/stats/lesson2.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2015); see
LIPSON, supra note 65 at 182.
87. 68.26% x 10 samples = 6.826 (which rounds to 7).
88. 70-13.3.
89. 70+13.3.
90. See NOVA, supra note 86. See also LIPSON, supra note 65, p.182.
91. 2 x 13.3 = 26.6. 70-26.6 = 43.4. 70+26.6 = 96.6.
92. 100% - 95.44% = 4.56%. 4.56% x 10 samples = .456 which rounds to 0, but is very
close to rounding up to 1.
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far outside the mainstream of data (it lies more than two standard
deviations outside the norm), the mean becomes 66.793 and the standard
deviation becomes 9.24.94 The new range of values that are within two
standard deviations of the mean is 48.22 to 85.18.95 The remaining nine
samples are all within this range. Unless there is a compelling justification
that explains why a value that lies outside two standard deviation of the
mean should be included, it should be discarded as suspect.
B. Calculating Total Damages
Once a sufficient statistical correlation is established linking the drug to
an increase in illness or disability, the next step it to determine the amount
of the total harm for which the manufacturer is responsible. To do this, it is
necessary to calculate the relative increase in harm, the total population that
has potentially been effected, and the total amount of damage that those
plaintiffs have suffered. Using these figures, a value can be assessed which
represents the total amount of actual harm which the manufacturer’s drug
caused.
1. Determine The Relative Increase In Harm
Calculating the relative increase in harm is accomplished by comparing
the presence of the disease or disability in the general population that has
not been exposed to the manufacturer’s product with its presence among
those groups that have been exposed to it. In the main example above, after
discarding the outlier of “100” for being too far outside the mainstream of
data, the expected value is 40 per thousand and the measured value is 66.7.96
This represents a relative increase of 26.7 per thousand.97 Statistically
speaking, that means that out of every 1000 people who were exposed to the
manufacturer’s product, approximately 26.7 of them became ill as a result of
exposure.
2. Determine the Total Population Potentially Affected
Once the relative increase has been calculated, it is necessary to identify
how many people have potentially been exposed to the product. This can be
93. (70+67+68+73+72+50+79+70+51)/9 = 600/9 ≈ 66.7.
94. √(Σ(X-M)2/n)
=
√((3.32+.32+1.32+6.32+5.32+16.72+12.32+3.32+15.72)/9)
=
√((10.89+.09+1.69+39.69+28.09+278.89+151.29+10.89+246.49)/9) = √(768.01/9) ≈ √85.33 ≈
9.24.
95. 66.7 – 2(9.24) = 66.7 – 18.48 = 48.22. 66.7 + 2(9.24) = 66.7 + 18.48 = 85.18.
96. See supra notes 70 and 82 with accompanying text.
97. 66.7-40 = 26.7.
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established in a number of ways, depending upon the nature of the
contaminant and the manner in which it was delivered or distributed. For
our purposes, we will assume that only the population of one small city
(80,000) has been effected, perhaps as a result of pollution that reached the
municipal water supply. We will further assume that all people have been
equally exposed. Of course, the manufacturer will always have the
opportunity to reduce the size of the class of potential plaintiffs by showing
that it is impossible for groups or individuals to have been exposed.98
3. Multiply The Increase By The Total Population Potentially Affected
If, as in the example above, an average of 26.7 out of every 1000 people in
the city (of 80,000) have been exposed to a manufacturer’s drug or other
defective product, then approximately 2136 people will contract the disease
or illness as a result the exposure.99 Of course, it is highly unlikely that
exactly 2136 people were directly harmed by the product. It is, however, the
best estimate which is able to be calculated statistically given the data
provided, and it is equally likely that this number is too low as it is that it is
too high. As such, it represents a fair figure to be used for the purposes of
calculating damages.
4. Determine the Average Harm Suffered per Person
Once the number of people who have actually suffered harm as a result
of using a manufacturer’s drug or other product, the next step is to
determine the amount of harm that those individuals suffered. Since it is
impossible to determine precisely which individuals were harmed, we must
examine the total group that was affected in calculating damages. Taking
this group as a whole, it will be necessary to calculate the total amount of
harm which all of those individuals have suffered and will suffer in the
future. This can be calculated according to traditional tort liability
calculation methods, including compensatory and even punitive damages.100
Once that total has been calculated, divide this figure by the total number of
people in the group to determine the average harm suffered per person.
Using the hypothetical scenario referenced earlier, if there are 80,000
people in the town and 66.7 per thousand have contracted the illness or
disease, then the total group size to be used for calculating damages is

98. Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (“[O]ne DES manufacturer was
dismissed from the action upon filing a declaration that it had not manufactured DES until
after plaintiff was born.”).
99. 26.7/1000 * 80,000 = 2,136.
100. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).
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5336.101 Assuming that the total damages suffered by that group equals
$50,000,000, this figure is then divided by 5336 to determine the average
harm suffered per person. This yields a value of $9,370.31.102
5. Multiply the Number of People Harmed by the Average Harm
Suffered per Person
After determining the average harm suffered per person, that figure must
then be multiplied by the number of those who have been harmed by the
manufacturer’s product. Since it has been determined that 2136 of that
group were harmed by the manufacturer’s defective product or negligent
action, this would yield a total of $20,014,982.16 which is directly traceable
to the manufacturer’s negligence.103 This represents the manufacturer’s total
liability.
This total liability is less than half of the amount of total harm suffered
because more than half of those affected were damaged by natural or
unexplained sources. In a jurisdiction that requires a “more than doubling”
of the occurrence of disease, the manufacturer would escape liability
completely. As a result, none of those affected would receive anything to
compensate them for their injuries. However, this raises another problem. If
$50,000,000 worth of harm is suffered and only $20,014,982.16 collected,
there is insufficient money to pay for all of the harm suffered by the entire
group that has been affected. This means that each person in the group can
be compensated for only a portion of the harm that the person has suffered.
It must be kept in mind, however, that unless relative liability is used, these
plaintiffs will receive no compensation at all.
C. Apportioning Damages to Individual Plaintiffs
Since the amount of damage suffered is greater than the money available
to compensate those who have been injured, some organized system must
be used to determine who receives how much of the total award. If all of the
people exposed to the product who show signs of the disease file suit to
recover for their injuries, distribution simply becomes a matter of assigning
each plaintiff an amount equal to their individual damages, multiplied by
the number of people injured by the defendant, and divided by the number
of people in the class. Using the previous example, if an individual suffered
$38,000 in damages, then that person’s share would be $15,211.39.104 If
101.
102.
103.
104.

66.7/1000 * 80,000 = 5,336.
$50,000,000 / 5,336 = $9,370.31.
2,136 * $9,370.31 = $20,014,982.16.
$38,000 * 2,136 / 5,336 = $15,211.39.
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another person’s injuries amounted to $5,000, that person would receive
$2,001.50.105 Each individual plaintiff will receive approximately 40% of his
or her total injury, since that is the portion of the total group’s injuries that
has been attributed to the manufacturer.106
In many cases, however, fewer than the total number of plaintiffs
available to seek compensation for their injuries avail themselves of that
opportunity. 107 Many decide that it is not worth the effort,108 considering
the cost of litigation109 and the length of time between filing suit and
collecting any potential award.110 Others are intimidated by the prospect of
filing suit due to their lack of familiarity with the legal system.111 Still others
are completely unaware that a link has been established between their injury
and a product with which they have come in contact.112 For this reason, it is
entirely possible that as few as 10% of those entitled to collect damages will
choose to do so.113
Regardless of how many people ultimately sue, or whether they choose to
do so individually, through joinder as an aggregate claim, or via a class
action lawsuit, the amount paid to that group of people will be based on
their total injury. For example, if only one person in the hypothetical chose
to sue for his or her injuries, the amount of recovery would be based only
on that person’s damages. Whatever the individual’s damages were
calculated to be, he or she would be awarded just over 40%114 of that total. If
ten people chose to join their claims together for greater efficiency,115 then
the value of that group of ten would be calculated and the total would be
multiplied by 40%, with each individual in the group receiving his or her
share according to the value of his or her individual injury.

105. $5,000 * 2,136 / 5,336 = $2,001.50.
106. 2,136 / 5,336 =.4003 or 40.03%.
107. Catherine R. Hecker, Note, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes: Taming “Too Big to Fail”
Classes in the Battle Against Blackmail Actions And Frivolous Litigation, 7 LIBERTY U. L. REV
49, 50 (2012).
108. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN 68 (RAND Institute for Civil Justice 2000).
109. STEFAN WRBKA ET AL., COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 3 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
110. Id. at 6.
111. Id. at 4-5.
112. BRIAN ANDERSON & ANDREW TRASK, THE CLASS ACTION PLAYBOOK 194 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2d ed. 2012).
113. Jay Tidmarsh, Living in Cafa’s World, 32 REV. LITIG. 691, 708 n.67 (2013) (“Only
about 10% of people with viable tort claims seek a lawyer’s assistance.”).
114. 40.02998%, to be exact.
115. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 108, at 49.

2016]

DECIPHERING DAUBERT’S DILEMMA

255

If the number of potential plaintiffs is small and the amount to be
awarded is large, individual suits may be profitable.116 But in situations
where there is a large number of plaintiffs whose individual awards would
be relatively small, the class action lawsuit is the most efficient mechanism
for providing a means of holding manufacturers liable and providing relief
for those affected by their negligence.117 Among its other virtues, class
action lawsuits provide the best method of incorporating all potential
plaintiffs whose claims enjoy a high degree of commonality into one cause
of action.118 Such a system would ensure that no one is left out119 and that
the negligent manufacturer will be held accountable for all injuries for
which it is responsible.
If the plaintiff is seeking to recover as part of a class action lawsuit, then
“both the representative plaintiffs and the counsel they have chosen owe
absent class members a fiduciary duty to protect the absentees’ interests
throughout the litigation.”120 This includes trying to find all of those who
might potentially have a claim and working to receive the largest award or
settlement possible.121 Of course, all of this takes time and that time takes
the form of legal fees, which amounts to less money available to distribute
to the class. “Often class action litigation means only a big paycheck for
lawyers, and little satisfaction for the injured clients.”122
IV. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ADOPTION
This section analyzes the effect relative liability will have on consumers,
manufacturers and the legal system in general if it is adopted. Among the
issues that will be addressed are the types of cases for which relative liability
is best suited, the level of statistical correlation that will produce an
adequate remedy, and the effect of only receiving partial compensation for
victims. Finally, a case will be made that this method of computing and

116. Laura J. Hines, The Dangerous Allure of the Issue Class Action, 79 IND. L.J. 567, 572
(2004).
117. Natalie C. Scott, Don’t Forget Me! The Client In A Class Action Lawsuit, 15 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 561, 563-64 (2002).
118. See ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 112, at 28.
119. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 108, at 50.
120. Barboza v. W. Coast Digital GSM, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 299 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009).
121. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175 (1974) (“[T]he express language and
intent of Rule 23(c)(2) leave no doubt that individual notice must be provided to those class
members who are identifiable through reasonable effort.”).
122. Scott, supra note 117, at 565.
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assigning liability is the most just method for both consumers and
manufacturers alike.
A. Scenarios For Which Relative Liability is Best Suited
In theory, relative liability could be used to assign liability to a
manufacturer in instances in which there is only a 2% or 3% increase in the
occurrence of illness or disease. While this indicates that at least some of
those who are injured contracted the illness as a result of the manufacturer’s
product, the causal link is so slight and the amount of recovery is so small in
comparison to the legal fees required to produce a recovery that it would be
practically of no value to pursue these “‘negative-value’ or ‘small-stakes’
class action suits.”123 Only in instances in which the number of people
affected is vast or the amount of harm produced per person is very large
would relative liability prove useful with only small increases linked to
manufacturer negligence.
1. Cases In Which Multiple Studies Involving Large Sample Sizes
Have Been Performed
Because of the injustice which would result from requiring defendants to
pay for damages for which they are not responsible, it is important that
enough data be collected to provide a high degree of certainty that the
plaintiffs’ injuries resulted from the defendant’s negligence. Larger sample
sizes yield smaller margins of error,124 and multiple studies allow for the
results of those studies to be compared in order to determine if any
individual result is so far outside the mainstream that it should be
discarded.125
2. Class Action Lawsuits
Without question, the best use of relative liability is the class action
lawsuit. The fact that the accuracy of the calculations depends upon
aggregating large groups of potential claimants suggests that relative
liability is particularly well adapted to class action suits. Larger numbers
from a wide variety of people groups generates greater confidence in the
results, a lower margin of error, and the opportunity to compare results to
see if any of the samples are so far outside the rest of the data that they
deserve additional scrutiny. All of this leads to greater certainty that the

123. Tidmarsh, supra note 113, at 719.
124. See supra Part III.A and note 61.
125. See supra Part III.A.
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amount attributed to the manufacturer’s negligence is an accurate
representation of the harm for which that manufacturer is responsible.
Perhaps equally important is the opportunity it provides for alerting all
potential claimants that such a link has been established. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)126 requires that “the court must direct to class
members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort.”127 Furthermore, Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.”128 At least in theory, this should ensure that all of those who have
been harmed by being exposed to a product or contaminant will have the
opportunity to receive appropriate compensation for that harm and that
those claims will be pursued by someone with both the incentive and the
ability to recover that compensation.129
Responsibilities of the class representative include first and foremost a
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the members of the entire class.130 Because the
success or failure of the action filed and pursued by the class representative
will determine the ability of all members of the class to recover, it is
essential that such a representative have no competing interests that might
call into question his or her judgment. “If the class representative is not
adequate, class members may find their valid claims barred by res judicata,
or settled for less than their full value by a plaintiff with a weak claim or a
clear conflict of interest.”131
Such an individual must also have “the personal characteristics that class
members would look for in a representative.”132 Relevant factors include the
class representative’s knowledge of the case, his or her credibility and
personal integrity, and whether the representative advocates remedies that

126. ADMINISTRATIE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, Class Certification in California (2010),
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/classaction-certification.pdf (noting that while FRCP
Rules are not binding on state courts, “California certification standards and procedures
have evolved to include substantial parallels to those of the federal jurisdiction, with the
exception of the option for interlocutory appeal of the certification decision that is available
in the federal court.”).
127. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
128. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
129. See ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 112, at 33-34.
130. Id. at 34.
131. Id. at 33.
132. See id. at 34; see also In re WorldCom, Inc., 358 B.R. 585, 604 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2006).
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would benefit the class as a whole or primarily the class counsel.133 Anyone
claiming the right to serve as class representative may be disqualified by the
court upon motion of the defendant.
These precautions provide an excellent means of ensuring that as many
people as possible will have the opportunity to collect for their injuries, and
that the person leading that effort is both competent and loyal. In the
process, it ensures that manufacturers will be held accountable for the total
harm that their products cause. Establishing an accurate level of
compensation is not only just, but it is essential to establishing the correct
level of deterrence.134
Another advantage of the class action lawsuit is its ability to produce
consistency of outcomes.135 Without it, the potential exists for plaintiffs to
be awarded varying levels of compensation for their injuries, with some
likely receiving no compensation at all.136 By standardizing the process, and
consolidating all potential claims for consideration, more resources may be
invested in the process of determining the true proportion of the harm for
which the manufacturer is responsible, and all plaintiffs’ awards will be
based on this determination.137
Having stated this, there are a few disadvantages associated with the class
action format. In particular, class action suits allow trivial or highly
speculative injuries to be compounded by the specter of “huge financial
exposure associated with these mega-lawsuits [to the point that]
manufacturers feel forced to settle these claims rather than contest them.” 138
In so doing, many good products are forced out of the market because of
the fear of incurring litigation expenses.139 Adopting relative liability may
allow lawsuits to go forward in which only small increases in relative risk
are alleged to have occurred since plaintiffs will not have to demonstrate
that their risk of harm was not more than doubled by exposure to the
manufacturer’s product. While this is true, it is a price that must be weighed
in the balance between enabling plaintiffs and promoting efficiency.140 Of
course, this concern could be greatly alleviated by implementing a
minimum level of increased risk of harm required to bring a claim.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 112, at 35-36.
See WRBKA ET AL., supra note 109, at 3.
See ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 112, at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 14-15.
See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 108, at 50.
Id.
Id.
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3. Cases in Which The Increased Occurrence Is At Least 25%
Since manufacturers will only be held accountable for the amount of
harm that they actually cause, situations will arise in which there is far more
harm suffered than money collected to compensate all injuries suffered by
those affected. In fact, if relative liability is used exclusively in cases in which
the increase in occurrence is less than 100% (thus failing to meet the “more
than doubling” requirement), the amount available will always be less than
50% of what would be required to fully compensate the victims.141 However,
limiting application to these scenarios would be as equally unjust as is the
current “more than doubling” requirement utilized in some jurisdictions,
which allows for no recovery at all.
Nonetheless, there are practical considerations that make applying
relative liability less attractive in certain situations, particularly those in
which there is only a small increased occurrence. Although 25% is an
arbitrary figure, suits involving less than this amount of increase would be
difficult to pursue when applying relative liability. Not only is proving
causation more difficult, but the amount ultimately awarded may be so
small that it is not worth pursuing after all expenses are accounted for.142
This should not be viewed as a bright line rule, however, as it is conceivable
that in cases with large individual damages such a suit may be economically
feasible.
Another practical limitation involves cases in which nearly all of the
increased occurrence of harm can be linked to the manufacturer. In such
instances, it is practically certain that the plaintiff’s harm developed as a
result of being exposed to the manufacturer’s product. Since causation is
virtually certain, the somewhat reduced individual award may be viewed as
an unwelcome complication that stands in the way of the plaintiff’s
complete restoration. The decision to impose either a floor or a ceiling is

141. The amount available, expressed as a ratio, will be equal to “P/(100+P),” where
P=the percentage of increase. For example, if exposure to a certain drug raises one’s chances
of contracting an illness by 20%, then the manufacturer is responsible for 1/6 of the total
harm suffered, because (20/(100+20)) = 20/120 = 1/6. If the drug resulted in a 50% increase
in occurrence, then the manufacturer would be responsible for 1/3 of the damages, because
(50/(100+50)) = 50/150 = 1/3. At a 100% level of increased occurrence, representing an exact
doubling, a person chosen at random who both consumed the drug and contracted the
illness would be equally likely to have received his injuries from natural causes or from
taking the drug. At this level, the manufacturer would be liable for 1/2 of the harm suffered,
because (100/(100+100)) = 100/200 = 1/2.
142. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 108, at 463.
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inherently a prudential decision that is best left for the legislature, not the
courts.143
Where relative liability clearly demonstrates its value is in cases between
these extremes, particularly those in which causation is very nearly split
between natural causes and the negligence of the defendant. Currently, a
manufacturer that produces a drug which increases a patient’s likelihood of
developing an illness by 100% or less is subject to no liability in jurisdictions
which have adopted the “more than doubling” requirement.144 But if the
drug increases the occurrence by just over 100%, the manufacturer is
required to pay for all of the damages of those who took the drug and
developed the illness. This policy lends itself to absurd possibilities.
Consider, for example, a manufacturer who markets and distributes a
drug that is later found to cause skin cancer. Many people who did not take
this drug also develop the same cancer. After many years and numerous
studies, it is determined that taking the drug results in a 95% increase in the
occurrence of this type of skin cancer. Furthermore, due to the length of
time during which the drug was marketed, approximately 20 million people
took the drug, with 300,000 of those developing this variety of cancer. In a
jurisdiction which insists upon a finding that the cancer is “more likely than
not” the result of taking the drug, the manufacturer would pay nothing.145
Thus, despite the fact that it is readily demonstrable that over 146,000
people146 contracted skin cancer due to using this drug, the manufacturer
will not be required to pay anything toward their injuries.
Equally absurd is the fact that if the drug had been shown to be
responsible for a 105% increase in skin cancer occurrence, the manufacturer
would be responsible for paying for the injuries of all of the victims, despite
the fact that over 146,000147 of them contracted cancer through no fault of
the manufacturer at all. Assuming an average award of $50,000 per person,
this would yield a judgment of $15 billion dollars.148 In this scenario, the

143. Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Marbury v. Madison and the Foundation of Law, 4 LIBERTY U. L.
REV. 297, 329-30 (2010).
144. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995).
145. A 95% increase equates to a relative risk of only 1.95. Jurisdictions which adhere to
“more likely than not” require a relative risk exceeding 2.0.
146. The ratio of cancer victims for which the manufacturer is responsible equals
(95/100+95) = 95/195 = 19/39. Multiplying this by the total number of people who have skin
cancer among those who took the drug yields (19/39) * 300,000 = 146,153.846153847.
147. In this case, the formula used to calculate the ratio of victims who were not harmed
by the drug is (100/(100+P)), where P=the percentage of increased occurrence.
(100/(100+105)) = 100/205 = 20/41. (20/41) * 300,000 = 146,341.463414634.
148. 300,000 victims * $50,000/victim = $15,000,000,000.
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addition of fewer than 8,000 victims produced a result in which the
manufacturer became responsible for all 300,000 victims.
Had relative liability been applied to these scenarios, this massive
disparity of outcomes would have been avoided. In the first instance, the
drug manufacturer would have been responsible for the injuries of the
146,154 victims that its drug was estimated to have produced. Using an
average award of $50,000 per victim, this would yield a judgment of
$7,307,700,000.149 In the second scenario, the manufacturer would have
been responsible for paying for the 153,659 victims150 whose cancer was
caused by using this drug. This would result in a judgment of
$7,682,950,000.151
By using relative liability, the increase of 7,505 victims152 resulted in an
increased award of $375,250,000,153 the exact value that those claims should
produce at $50,000 each.154 This is far more sensible and equitable to both
the victims and the manufacturer than a shift from nothing at all to
$15,000,000,000. Of course, assigning less than 100% of the victim’s harm to
the manufacturer comes with its own problems. The primary drawback is
that a victim may not have enough money available to completely pay for
the treatment necessary to remedy his or her illness, assuming that such a
remedy is available. However, this is not unlike the remedies produced in
“comparative fault” jurisdictions when the plaintiff is determined to be at
least partly responsible for his own harm.
B. Similarities to “Comparative Fault”
In fact, the practical application of relative liability bears a striking
similarity to that of comparative fault. The use of “comparative negligence”
developed from the abandonment of the doctrine of contributory
negligence by most jurisdictions.155 As of this writing, only Virginia,
Maryland, North Carolina, Alabama, and the District of Columbia still hold

149. 146,154 victims * $50,000/victim = $7,307,700,000.
150. The ratio equals (105/(100+105)) = 105/205 = 21/41. (21/41) * 300,000 =
153,658.536585366.
151. 153,659 victims * $50,000/victim = $7,682,950,000.
152. 153,659 – 146,154 = 7,505.
153. 7,682,950,000 - $7,307,700,000 = $375,250,000.
154. 7,505 victims * $50,000/victim = $375,250,000.
155. Williams v. Delta Int’l Mach. Corp., 619 So. 2d 1330, 1334 (Ala. 1993) (“[A]lmost
every common law jurisdiction in the world and forty-six American states have replaced the
outmoded doctrine of contributory negligence with some form of the doctrine of
comparative negligence.”).
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to the contributory negligence doctrine.156 In jurisdictions that still employ
contributory negligence, a plaintiff who in any way contributes to his own
injury is completely prevented from receiving any recovery. 157
By contrast, comparative fault assigns liability based upon the percentage
of harm for which each party is responsible.158 For example, if the plaintiff
is 10% liable for his injury (perhaps due to speeding) and the defendant is
responsible for the remaining 90% (due to running a stop light, for
example), the defendant will be forced to pay for 90% of the plaintiff’s
injuries.159 Some jurisdictions have placed limitations on the amount of
fault that the plaintiff may be responsible for and still be allowed to
recover.160 Ironically, California has chosen to adopt pure comparative
fault,161 yet it still clings to the “more than doubling” requirement. This
logical inconsistency allows plaintiffs in California to recover even when
they are primarily responsible for their own injury, yet absolves negligent
manufacturers from liability unless the manufacturer’s actions produced a
majority of the harm. Each of these versions of comparative fault shares two
things in common with relative liability. In both systems, plaintiffs receive
less in damages than the total harm that they suffered. Also, in each system
someone (or something) other than the defendant is at least partly to blame
for the plaintiff’s harm.
1. Plaintiffs Are Awarded Less Than 100% of The Harm Suffered
A fair concern about applying relative liability is that it may leave the
injured plaintiff with less than the amount required to remedy the injury
that he or she suffered. In fact, a person suffering $100,000 in damages may
156. Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 69 A.3d 1149, 1158 (Md. 2013) (Harrell, J.,
dissenting) (“A dinosaur roams yet the landscape of Maryland (and Virginia, Alabama,
North Carolina and the District of Columbia), feeding on the claims of persons injured by
the negligence of another, but who contributed proximately in some way to the occasion of
his or her injuries, however slight their culpability. The name of that dinosaur is the doctrine
of contributory negligence.”).
157. McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tenn. 1992) (“‘[I]f a party, by his own
gross negligence, brings an injury upon himself, or contributes to such injury, he cannot
recover;’ for, in such cases, the party ‘must be regarded as the author of his own
misfortune.’”) (quoting Whirley v. Whiteman, 38 Tenn. 610, 619 (1858)).
158. 18 S.C. JUR. NEGLIGENCE § 30.
159. Donald G. Gifford & Christopher J. Robinette, Apportioning Liability in Maryland
Tort Cases: Time to End Contributory Negligence and Joint and Several Liability, 73 MD. L.
REV. 701, 709 (2014).
160. 18 S.C. JUR. NEGLIGENCE § 30.
161. 2 CAL. AFFIRMATIVE DEF. § 48:1 (2d ed.) (“California followed an all or nothing
contributory negligence standard until 1975 when the Supreme Court adopted pure
comparative negligence as the standard in Liv. Yellow Cab Co.”).
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only recover $25,000 if the increased occurrence of the injury is only 25%.162
After taking into account the portion paid in attorneys’ fees and court costs,
this recovery will be even smaller. But this same concern is present when
applying comparative fault, particularly in a jurisdiction that employs pure
comparative fault.163 From the plaintiffs’ perspective, any amount available
to help them recover is better than no recovery at all. From the defendants’
perspective, knowing that they will be held accountable for even a small
increase in harm to others will encourage more responsible behavior.
2. At Least Part Of The Harm Is Produced By A Source Other Than
The Defendant
As is the case in comparative fault jurisdictions, defendants in relative
liability cases are only responsible for the portion of the plaintiff’s harm the
defendant caused. With respect to relative liability, however, the other
contributing source of harm is natural or unexplained as opposed to the
plaintiff’s own negligence. In both cases, liability is assigned in direct
proportion to the total amount of harm actually produced by the defendant.
C. Effect on Business and the Public
Considering the similarity to comparative fault, the financial effects of
implementing relative liability would likely be similar. Opponents of
comparative fault suggest that adoption leads to an increase in lawsuits,
costlier trials, and more numerous awards of damages.164 This could lead to
increased liability insurance premiums that may harm the state’s
economy.165
1. Effect on the Court System
If the 25% minimum increase level is adopted, 166 the concern about
frivolous lawsuits being filed solely for the purpose of promoting settlement
will be greatly alleviated.167 While it is almost certain that the number of
162. Ratio = (25/100+25) = 25/125 = 1/5. 1/5 * $100,000 = $20,000.
163. Comparative Negligence/Fault, 2015 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 3030 (2009 WL
4034547) (“Under pure comparative fault, a plaintiff will not be barred from recovery, no
matter how great his fault in causing his injuries, unless his conduct is the sole proximate
cause of the harm. For example, if a plaintiff is 80 percent at fault and his total damages are
determined to be $100,000, the plaintiff will recover only $20,000.”).
164. See Gifford & Robinette, supra note 159, at 731.
165. Id.
166. See supra Part IV.A.
167. See Gifford & Robinette, supra note 159, at 734 (“Victor Schwartz, the leading
commentator on comparative fault and, on most issues, the nation’s leading proponent of
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lawsuits will increase in jurisdictions which adopt relative liability, there is
no reason to believe that the administrative costs per trial would be any
different. In addition, the instances in which plaintiffs will be able to collect
in cases in which they are currently barred will be offset by the reduced
awards in cases in which the defendant’s negligence accounts for only
slightly more than half of the increased occurrence of harm. In some cases,
defendants will pay substantially less if relative fault is adopted. 168
2. Effect on the Economy
Since the number of suits being filed will not increase substantially, the
net effect on businesses will be driven primarily by the overall increase or
decrease in awards that they are forced to pay. Overall, the amount paid out
in damages will only increase if there are many more cases in which the
increased risk is less than 100% than there are cases in which it is greater
than that level.169 In fact, the aggregate of payments will probably be less
than that currently paid if a minimum threshold for the manufacturer’s
percentage of increase is adopted, similar to that employed in “slight/gross”
and modified comparative fault jurisdictions.170
If a 25% minimum increase requirement is imposed,171 using relative
liability will only generate additional lawsuits when the increased harm is
between 25-100%.172 This will produce recoveries between 25-50% of the
total harm.173 Meanwhile, manufacturers who are currently required to pay
the entire expense of remedying the harm will experience a reduction in
nearly half of future cases.174 Among those whose damages are reduced, the

tort reform, states that the contention that comparative fault would create a greater flood of
litigation or discourage settlement has been refuted.”).
168. See supra Part IV.A and notes 148-52.
169. Cases in which the increased risk is less than 100% will generate at most a 50%
recovery. Likewise, cases in which it is greater than that level will generate as much as a 50%
savings.
170. In “slight/gross” comparative fault jurisdictions, the plaintiff may only collect if his
own negligence is slight. In modified comparative fault jurisdictions, the plaintiff’s
negligence may be no more than that of the defendant. See Harrison Ford Hagg, SlightlyGross: South Dakota’s Addiction to A Bad Comparative Negligence Law and the Need for
Change, 59 S.D. L. REV. 139, 146-47 (2014).
171. See supra Part IV.A.
172. Suits in which the relative increase is more than 100% are already allowed in all
jurisdictions. If a 25% floor is employed, this would lower this requirement to that level.
173. (25/(25+100)) = 25/125 = 1/5 = 20%. (100/(100+100)) = 100/200 = 1/2 = 50%.
174. Any case in which the manufacturer’s portion of the harm exceeds 50% will be
eligible for a reduction in liability if relative liability is adopted. The amount of reduction will
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amount of that reduction will be as high as 50%.175 Because of these
offsetting savings and expenses, the overall effect on the economy should be
neutral.
3. Effect on Victims
The greatest effect of adopting relative liability will be felt by victims who
are currently deprived of the opportunity to be made whole: those plaintiffs
who receive no compensation for injuries which are clearly traceable to the
actions of negligent manufacturers. Even a partial award will allow them to
receive some help in recovering from the harm that they have suffered.
While it may be insufficient to compensate them for their pain and
suffering, it will help with medical treatment and possible lost wages.176
4. Effect on Defendant Businesses
The greatest concern raised by those opposed to adopting relative
liability and comparative fault is that imposing liability in cases in which
suit is currently barred would drive up liability insurance premiums and
that those costs would be passed along to consumers in the form of higher
prices.177 This concern has already been addressed previously and is only
one of the factors to be considered in determining whether implementation
of relative liability is appropriate. Perhaps the greatest effect to be weighed
is what changes businesses will make in response to its adoption.
Some products will undoubtedly be driven from the market, just as they
are today, but to an even greater extent.178 However, this should only apply
to those products that can be traced to at least some increase in consumer
illness or injury. If the product is only marginally profitable before taking
litigation expenses and possible payouts into consideration, it is probably
not worth the offsetting harm that its use causes to society and to those who
use it. Relative fault, then, will serve to cull products from the market that
should not have been introduced in the first place.
More importantly, the ability to bring suit keeps manufacturers honest.
Whether state or federal, most government agencies simply do not have the
resources to monitor every product or service being offered within their
be equal to the amount of harm which occurs through natural or otherwise unexplained
causes.
175. Since the manufacturer’s savings will be equal to the amount produced by other
sources it could approach 50%, since savings will only occur in cases in which the
manufacturer is currently liable for more than 50% of the harm.
176. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235 (1992).
177. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 108, at 50.
178. Id.
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jurisdictions.179 “Whereas public attorneys generally may be reluctant to
bring meritorious suits because of financial or political constraint, private
attorneys generally” are more than willing due to the prospect of financial
gain.180 As such, manufacturer liability suits act as a private regulatory
agency.181
Finally, there is the moral imperative to hold those responsible who
injure others through their actions, intentionally or otherwise. Allowing
those who injure others to escape accountability for their actions promotes
irresponsible corporate behavior. 182
The essence of corrective justice is that a party who wrongfully
injures another must correct the wrong to restore the moral
balance between the parties. Injurers cannot literally correct the
wrong by healing the injury; liability is therefore imposed as a
substitute for the previous bodily health and autonomy. Under
contributory negligence, an injurer can be relieved of the burden
of correcting her moral wrong.”183
Those who are only responsible for a small harm will only be assessed a
small judgment. Efforts that reduce the harmful effects of products will be
reflected in a reduction of liability imposed upon those who manufacture
them.
Currently, there is no financial incentive for a manufacturer to take steps
to lower the proportion of harm that its products cause unless it crosses the
50% threshold. For example, if the manufacturer’s proportion of harm is
reduced from 45% to 25%, the manufacturer will still pay nothing. Likewise,
if its percentage of harm is reduced from 90% to 55%, it will still pay for the
entire harm. Either way, there is no financial incentive to make its products
safer. If a jurisdiction adopted relative liability, each measure taken to make
a product safer would be matched by a corresponding reduction in liability.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has demonstrated how to prove with a fair degree of accuracy
the portion of increased harm that a manufacturer’s product has produced
in a class of victims. By adopting a minimum level of increased causation of

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 72.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See Gifford & Robinette, supra note 159, at 725-26.
Id.
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25%, the concern of a flood of frivolous lawsuits may be avoided. Equity
demands, and common sense dictates, that plaintiffs be compensated for
the loss that they have sustained. By holding manufacturers responsible for
the exact amount of harm that their products cause, they will be
incentivized to employ safety measures which reduce the risk associated
with use of their products, regardless of whether they cross the arbitrary
50% threshold. The time has come for courts to adopt relative liability and
provide justice for those to whom it is currently denied.

